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 Moral Development in Adolescence
Daniel Hart, Rutgers University
and 
Gustavo Carlo, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Th emes in the papers in this special issue of the JRA on moral devel-
opment are identifi ed. We discuss the intersection of moral develop-
ment research with policy concerns, the distinctive qualities of moral 
life in adolescence that warrant investigation, the multiple connota-
tions of “moral,” the methods typical of moral development research, 
and the infl uences that shape adolescent moral development. Sug-
gestions are made for new methods and new directions in the study 
of moral development.
Moral development in adolescence has reached maturity as an area of re-
search. Th is special issue of the Journal of Research on Adolescence, which col-
lects some of the very best investigations on adolescent moral development, is 
one indication. Expansive reviews of the large literature will also appear in the 
Handbook of Moral Development (Killen & Smetana, in press), the Handbook 
of Child Development (Damon, in press), and in the most recent volume in the 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation series (Carlo & Edwards, in press). More-
over, there are hundreds of research papers related to moral development in 
adolescence appearing each year, many of which escape synthesis in the vari-
ous reviews and collections just mentioned.
 THE INTERSECTION OF MORALITY AND ADOLESCENCE
 Why has moral development in adolescence become such a popular top-
ic among researchers? Th ere are political and theoretical reasons for the 
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attention paid to moral development. Th e political reason is that research is in-
fl uenced by public opinion particularly through federal funding of research, and 
the public believes that adolescents are morally defi cient. When asked in a re-
cent national poll to describe adolescents, almost three-quarters of American 
adults used words suggesting moral shortcomings such as “rude,” “irresponsible,” 
and so on (Duff ett, Johnson, & Farkas, 1999). Only 15% of adults in the same 
survey described teenagers positively (Duff ett et al., 1999). Asked to identify the 
most serious problem confronting youth, American adults answered that it is 
the failure of adolescents to learn moral values (Duff ett et al., 1999). Given the 
perceptions that American youth are morally defi cient and that this shortcom-
ing threatens society (perceptions that are surely wrong; see Youniss & Hart, 
2002 for an exploration), it is not surprising that policy makers and researchers 
have focused attention on moral development.
While the burgeoning of literature on moral development in adolescence 
has been driven in part by the mistaken belief that today’s cohort of youth is 
particularly immoral, it is also a product of the recognition of the genuine the-
oretical opportunities off ered by focusing on adolescents’ moral capacities. Th e 
papers in this issue capitalize on this insight in various ways.
One important theme in the papers in this issue is that adolescence is the 
foundation for adulthood. Matsuba and Walker suggest that moral exem-
plars—Gandhi, for example—can be understood by studying the developing 
moral commitments of adolescents and young adults. Implicit in their article 
is the supposition that adult moral character is given some shape in adoles-
cence. In other words, by understanding and eventually controlling the infl u-
ences acting on the adolescent, adult moral character development can be set 
on the correct path.
Th e same theme is found in the article by Lawford and colleagues (Lawford, 
Pratt, Hunsberger, & Pancer). Lawford et al. suggest that adult generativity has 
its roots in adolescent experience. Th e results of their work suggest that young 
adults who are committed to caring for others are more likely than those less 
committed to have had good relationships with their parents and community 
service experiences in adolescence. Similarly, Smetana and Metzger suggest that 
civic engagement, which refl ects adults’ moral obligations to their communities, 
is vitally connected to experiences within the family and church.
A second theme found in all the papers is that adolescence has qualities 
that make it developmentally distinct from childhood. As a result of these dis-
tinct qualities, moral character can be transformed between childhood and 
adulthood. Certainly, in many Western cultures, one quality that generally 
separates adolescents from children is that the former spend more time than
the latter with peers. Moreover, adolescents spend less time with their parents 
than children. As a consequence, adolescents are probably more infl uenced by 
their peers than are children. For this reason, Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-
Loeber focus particularly on the contribution of adolescents’ peers on the sus-
tenance of delinquency. In addition to the prominence of peers, there are a 
variety of other age-graded changes that distinguish the contexts of adoles-
cents’ lives from those of children. Th ese include transition into large schools, 
the world of work, and romantic relationships, to name just a few. As a conse-
quence, moral life has new challenges, opportunities, and infl uences.
Adolescence brings with it not only distinctive contexts and experiences 
but skills as well. As Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, and Shepa-
rd point out in their article, there is a substantial research base demonstrat-
ing that a variety of skills and types of expertise related to moral life are more 
developed in adolescence than they are in childhood. For example, Eisen-
berg and her colleagues review research suggesting that there are improve-
ments in the abilities to infer the perspective of others, to understand the self, 
and to solve social problems. Development in most of these skills builds upon 
childhood achievements and, consequently, adolescence does not constitute a 
unique psychological stage set apart from that of childhood. Nonetheless, the 
refi nements in skills permit adolescents to engage in moral life more eff ective-
ly than is typically possible for children.
Together, the variety of contexts and new skills make adolescence a partic-
ularly interesting period in which to investigate infl uences on moral develop-
ment. Th e research in this special issue examines the eff ects on moral develop-
ment of psychological processes (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & 
Shepard, Matsuba, & Walker), parents (Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, & Pancer, 
Smetana, & Metzger), peers (Pardini, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber), social 
institutions (Smetana & Metzger), and cultural practices (e.g., volunteering, 
Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, & Pancer). During childhood, parents mediate 
children’s contact with social institutions, monitor their contacts with peers, 
and control their participation in cultural practices. Th e powerful infl uence of 
parents on children makes the study of moral socialization in childhood less 
complex, and perhaps less challenging, than the investigation of the factors af-
fecting moral growth in adolescence.
Adults, like adolescents, live in a rich milieu of family, friends, institutions, 
and cultural practices. Unlike adolescents, however, adults do not change rap-
idly. As William James (1890, p. 121) noted, “It is well for the world that in 
most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never 
soften again.” While James probably underestimated the potential for change 
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in adulthood, there is little evidence to indicate that adulthood is as fertile a 
period in which to examine age-related change as is adolescence. It is because 
adolescents are both (1) open to a rich variety of infl uences and (2) change 
considerably as a result of these infl uences that make them particularly inter-
esting to study for psychologists interested in the factors infl uencing moral 
development.
 WHAT CONSTITUTES “MORAL” IN THE STUDY OF 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT?
 Th ere is broad agreement that interest in moral development among psy-
chologists was kindled by Kohlberg’s (1984) work on moral judgment. Kohl-
berg sought to synthesize insights from liberal philosophers such as Raw-
ls (1971) with the cognitive-developmental psychology of Piaget (1965) and 
Baldwin (1902). Th e result was a line of work that focused on the develop-
ment of understanding of moral issues such as rights and justice. Much of 
the fi eld followed Kohlberg’s lead, and as a consequence a substantial body of 
work has accumulated over the last 40 years concerning children’s and adoles-
cents’ understanding of rights, responsibilities, and the principles that can be 
used to adjudicate among confl icting claims.
Th e gradual elaboration of understanding of justice and moral claims is not 
all there is to moral development, of course, and in the last 20 years many 
theorists and researchers have enlarged the domain of investigation by focus-
ing on other topics. Th is expansion is evident in the papers in this special is-
sue. In their contribution to this issue, Eisenberg and her colleagues present 
their latest fi ndings on adolescents’ prosocial reasoning. Eisenberg was one of 
the leaders in the movement to broaden the study of moral development be-
yond the boundaries of the study of confl icts of rights and an understanding 
of justice (see, for example, Eisenberg-Berg, 1979), and the work on prosocial 
moral reasoning in this issue, and her research on the emotional components 
to moral life (e.g., Eisenberg, in press), continues this eff ort.
Like Eisenberg and her colleagues, Matsuba and Walker focus on the pro-
social domain. Th ey seek to understand the roots of sustained prosocial action 
by examining the life stories provided by dedicated volunteers, a line of re-
search much followed by personality researchers. Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, 
and Pancer study generativity, which they defi ne as “care and concern for the 
next generation,” a construct drawn from Erikson’s (1968) infl uential theory 
of psychosocial development, which has evident prosocial qualities. Smetana 
and Metzger focus on civic participation, a form of obligation to the pub-
lic good that is most frequently studied by political scientists (e.g., Putnam, 
2000). Finally, Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-Loeber are concerned with 
beliefs about anti-social or delinquent activity.
Each of the topics examined in the articles in this issue bears clear con-
nections to our everyday notions of morality. Moreover, the diversity of the 
topics represents well the breadth of investigations in moral development, a 
breadth necessary to track the complexity of real life. Th e concern for practical 
morality—charity to others, caring for the next generation, delinquency, civic 
engagement—make the fi eld more relevant to policy makers and the general 
public than moral development research was 30 years ago, when its principal 
focus was moral judgment sophistication.
Th e cost of this increased relevance is that it is diffi  cult to abstract clear 
boundaries for the moral domain from the collection of topics in this issue. 
If the study of moral judgment that dominated the fi eld 30 years ago some-
times seemed irrelevant for understanding moral life, it did off er fairly clear 
criteria demarcating its subject matter. Th is clarity now seems lost. For ex-
ample, it is diffi  cult to read the article by Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-
Loeber on delinquency and discern clear conceptual links to the research 
on civic engagement by Smetana and Metzger. Similarly, one could as easily 
read the paper on generativity by Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, and Pancer or 
the article by Matsuba and Walker on the life narratives of moral exemplars 
in an issue on adolescent personality as in an issue like this one on moral de-
velopment.
In our view, there is conceptual benefi t in seeking the essences of notions 
like “morality” even if the collection of topics in this issue makes evident how 
diffi  cult this search is likely to be. Th e outline of topics within the moral do-
main off ered by Bernard Williams (1995, p. 551) is particularly useful in this 
regard. Williams suggests that moral philosophy seeks answers to three ques-
tions: “What is the right thing to do?,” “How is the best possible state of af-
fairs achieved?,” and “What qualities make for a good person?” Th ese three 
questions, which correspond to the deontological, utilitarian, and virtue tradi-
tions, respectively, overlap and yet, are not identical to each other. One of the 
benefi ts of a broad outline of the moral domain such as this one is that it helps 
prevent parochialism. Th e deontological line of investigation, which gained 
ascendance in psychology as a result of Kohlberg’s pioneering work, elicited 
controversy concerning whether it construed morality “correctly” or “incor-
rectly.” In retrospect, the energies of those involved in the debate might have 
been better spent complementing research in the deontological tradition with 
investigations best framed within the virtue and utilitarian traditions.
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William’s outlining of the moral domain not only alerts researchers in the 
fi eld to the full range of issues that merit consideration, it also helps to distin-
guish the study of moral development from investigations in the related areas 
of personality development, social development, cognitive development, and 
positive psychology. For example, the study of positive psychology, which has 
grown rapidly over the last decade, has as its foci “valued subjective experi-
ences” such as happiness, “positive individual traits,” and “civic virtues and the 
institutions which move individuals toward better citizenship” (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5). Clearly, there is an overlap in the investigations 
of moral development and positive psychology (the study of civic engagement, 
for example, may fall within both). Nonetheless, the questions that the two 
lines of work seek to answer are quite diff erent. Positive psychology seeks to 
answer questions such as “How can human fl ourishing be promoted?,” while 
moral theories, as we noted earlier, seek answers to questions such as “What is 
the right thing to do?,” “What is the best possible world?,” and “What quali-
ties make a morally worthy person?” Neither set of questions can be reduced 
to the other; both sets of questions are deserving of research.
 HOW IS MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE 
BEST STUDIED?
 Every primer on research methods for developmental psychology sug-
gests that complex psychological phenomena are best understood by using a 
variety of methods. Methodological pluralism is diffi  cult to obtain in prac-
tice, particularly so in the study of adolescents. For example, all of the ar-
ticles in this special issue rely on adolescent self-reports for data, and most 
of the articles rely exclusively on these self-reports. For example, Lawford, 
Pratt, Hunsberger, and Pancer tap adolescents’ sense of generativity by ask-
ing participants to judge the self-descriptiveness of items such as “Others 
would say that I have made unique contributions to society.” In the same 
study, adolescents rated the parenting they received resulting in a measure 
of parenting quality. Similarly, Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-Loeber re-
lied on adolescents’ self-reports concerning their beliefs regarding delin-
quency and their peers, Matsuba and Walker elicited adolescents’ narratives 
concerning their lives, and Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, and 
Shepard used self-report measures of empathy-related responding and pro-
social moral reasoning. For four of the fi ve articles in the special issue, then, 
self-reports were the primary sources of data.
Self-report measures are often valid and reliable indicators of attitudes, be-
havior, beliefs, and other psychological attributes. Moreover, it is often diffi  cult 
to collect other sorts of data when participants are adolescents. For example, 
it would be very diffi  cult to observe the peer associations of the large sam-
ple of adolescents in the study by Pardini, Loeber, and Stouthamer-Loeber, 
both because adolescents are unlikely to exhibit their typical behavior when 
they know they are being watched and because such a study would require an 
army of trained, sympathetic, observers. The demonstrated value of self-
report measures combined with the diffi  culty of obtaining other sorts of data 
on adolescent participants results in a line of investigation reliant on adoles-
cent self-reports.
All of the studies in this special issue are correlational in design, with none 
utilizing experimental procedures. Th e lack of experimental research seems to 
characterize the study of adolescence generally (Hart & Markey, 2004), and is 
not limited to research on moral development.
Correlational research has demonstrated its value in the study of mor-
al development. Piaget’s (1965) work on age-related changes in moral judg-
ment created a model for research that continues to infl uence research today. 
Researchers in moral development have been particularly attracted to lon-
gitudinal, correlational designs, following after Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, and 
Lieberman (1983). Indeed, four of the fi ve studies in this special issue are lon-
gitudinal. Th e general advantages of longitudinal research are well known and 
have been reviewed in methodology texts, and we believe that readers of this 
special issue will be convinced that longitudinal designs can contribute impor-
tant knowledge to the study of moral development.
Methodological pluralism should still be an aspiration for those involved 
in moral development, because even well-designed correlational, longitudinal 
studies cannot by themselves answer all questions of interest. One question for 
which longitudinal, correlational research may be unsatisfactory concerns the 
design of large-scale interventions. A number of reviewers (see, for example, 
Duncan, Magnuson, & Ludwig, 2004) have pointed out that estimates of the 
eff ects of diff erent infl uences (e.g., parenting, neighborhoods, schools) on ado-
lescent development derived from correlational, longitudinal studies are both 
prone to statistical artifacts and bear little correspondence to estimates derived 
from genuine large-scale interventions. Th is is not to suggest that correlation-
al studies ought to be abandoned, as this type of research has, and will contin-
ue to make important contributions to the study of moral development. Our 
point is that there remains a need for research of other designs, and that there 
may be real opportunity for investigators who venture off  the beaten path.
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 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR INFLUENCES OF MORALITY 
IN ADOLESCENCE?
 Primarily because of the contributions of cognitive developmental and 
moral socialization theories, the bulk of research on the infl uences of moral-
ity has focused on moral cognitions and socialization agents (such as parents). 
Th e study of adolescence reminds us, however, that other agents of change are 
important to study.
As several scholars have noted, there is growing evidence on the biologi-
cal basis of morally relevant tendencies and behaviors such as altruism and 
aggression (Carlo, in press; Coie & Dodge, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). 
Puberty signifi es the reemergence of biologically based processes that might 
impact moral development during adolescence. Th e physiological and physi-
cal maturation changes of puberty might be expected to enhance emotional 
sensitivity and intimacy, and consequently care-based emotions (e.g., empa-
thy, sympathy) and social behaviors. Conversely, the hormonal changes have 
also been linked to irritability and aggressiveness (although the fi ndings are 
mixed), which might mitigate altruism and facilitate aggression (Fabes, Car-
lo, Kupanoff , & Laible, 1998). To our knowledge, research on pubertal tim-
ing and its possible links to moral processes and behaviors have yet to be con-
ducted. However, other research suggests that specifi c neurotransmitters and 
hormones might be associated with prosocial behaviors and aggression (see 
Carlo & Bevins, 2002). One recent study showed specifi c brain regions as be-
ing activated during moral decision making (De Quervain, Fischbacher, Trey-
er, Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). Investigations of the in-
terplay of biological and socialization infl uences will provide more powerful 
models of morality.
Although family (including parents) has been the focus of much of the so-
cialization research, another study area of importance is peers—especially dur-
ing adolescence. Peers provide added “role-taking opportunities” and expose 
adolescents to novel moral behaviors (Hart, Atkins, Markey, & Youniss, 2004; 
Hart & Atkins, 2002). Furthermore, moral dilemmas can become much more 
important and challenging because their moral consequences become increas-
ingly signifi cant and personally relevant to the self and to others. For example, 
the development of intimate and romantic relationships during adolescence 
can expose them to personally signifi cant decision situations with far-reaching 
implications about who they are as a moral agent.
Adolescents also have more opportunities to become agentic in their social 
roles and responsibilities. For example, their engagement in work and commu-
nity activities (e.g., community service, extracurricular) and their increased ex-
posure to socially regulated behaviors (e.g., driving, smoking, alcohol, joining the 
military) frequently places adolescents in moral decision-making situations. Th e 
media (e.g., internet, magazines, fi lm) access and literacy level among many ad-
olescents provide additional unique and signifi cant socializing experiences that 
cannot be underestimated. Not only do adolescents have access to novel moral 
information but they are also capable of creating and promoting their moral be-
liefs and actions to others. No doubt, the infl uence of these socializing experi-
ences is intertwined with the impact of the authority fi gures and the peers who 
are part of the socializing spectrum of these opportunities.
 WHAT IS THE MORAL CULTURE OF ADOLESCENCE?
 Th e contributors to this special issue present a diverse set of fi ndings that 
provide a glimpse of the complex and multidimensional nature of the moral 
culture of adolescents. However, the moral culture of the adolescent is likely 
to be diff erent across diff erent societies as a result of culturally based practices 
that transmit moral messages. As ecocultural theorists note, parents from dif-
ferent cultures create unique opportunities and practices to train their children 
in their own moral system (e.g., Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Although there 
may be similarities in the change processes that occur, their meanings and per-
ceptions are likely to vary as a function of the unique social norms, mores, and 
belief systems. In turn, these perceptions likely impact their behaviors. Th e dy-
namic interplay among beliefs, norms, and perceptions creates a moral atmo-
sphere that is embedded in one’s culture. Th us, there are likely multiple cul-
tures of morality in adolescence.
At the level of the individual, understanding the multiple contexts (e.g., 
home, school, neighborhood, work) that adolescents navigate and the various 
agents of infl uence (e.g., biological, family, peers, media) bring us closer to un-
derstanding their complexity. All adolescents must learn to navigate through 
their own moral cultures in their respective communities. Th ese multiple mor-
al cultures may comprise their family demands, their peer demands, and the 
demands placed on them by the broader society (e.g., school systems). Each 
of these cultures presents diff erent cultural norms, beliefs, and norms that im-
pact their moral functioning. Th e task is to develop theories and models of 
adolescents’ moral development that consider these various levels of infl uence 
and their multiple contexts. Th e relevance of the research and policy making 
on adolescents’ moral development rests on our explicit acknowledgement of 
these complex issues.
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